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Abstract 
The Obama Administration’s Asia Pivot strategy has sought to strengthen the 
United States’ (US) bilateral security alliances in Asia, intensify working 
relationships with regional states and the US, and boost regional trade and 
investment. This paper investigates whether the Obama administration’s Asia 
Pivot has fulfilled its strategy of enhancing peace and cooperation in the Pacific, 
or whether it has in fact magnified the potential for regional conflict. In doing so, it 
seeks an answer to the following, interrelated questions: What have been the 
costs and benefits of the Asia Pivot strategy for the United States and regional 
actors? Is the Asia Pivot strategy an example of foreign policy success, or 
failure? For the purpose of this paper, foreign policy is understood as a multi-
dimensional concept that takes into account degree of goal attainment, the costs 
to the user; the costs to the target; and an identification of who has most at stake 
in the issue. In doing so it will argue that the costs of the Asia Pivot strategy have 
largely outweighed the benefits, thus having a negative impact on peace in the 
Asia Pacific. 
 
Introduction 
In an address to the Australian Parliament on 17 November 2011, President Barack Obama first 
formally outlined his Asia Pacific foreign policy strategy.
1
 This strategy reflected a ‘broader shift’2 
away from a focus on the Middle East, to what President Obama referred to as ‘the vast potential 
of the Asia Pacific region’.3 As the world’s fastest growing region, President Obama confirmed 
that he had: 
Made a deliberate and strategic decision – as a Pacific nation, the United States 
will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by 
upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.
4
 
President Obama highlighted five core underlying principles, which would shape the United 
States’ strategic shift towards Asia. The first was an emphasis on the United States’ commitment 
to security in the region. This would be maintained by a strong regional military presence, 
strengthened alliances with Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian states, the allocation of 
resources to project power and deter threats, and a pledge that reductions in US defense 
spending would not come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.
5
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Second, President Obama confirmed that the US would reengage with regional organisations, 
most notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Third, the United States 
would continue its effort to build a cooperative relationship with China, by seeking more 
opportunities for greater communication to avoid miscalculation.
6
 Fourth, President Obama 
pledged to advance US-Asia shared prosperity, through free and fair trade, and economic 
partnerships such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).
7
 Finally, President Obama reiterated the United States’ support for 
fundamental rights of every human being. 
President Obama’s address to the Australian parliament was not the first instance that this policy 
had been presented. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first outlined the Administration’s pivot 
strategy in her October 2011 article “America’s Pacific Century,” written for Foreign Policy.8 Here, 
Clinton stated that ‘the United States stands at a pivot point’, and that a ‘strategic turn to the 
[Asia] region fits logically into…[the United States’] overall global effort to secure and sustain 
America’s global leadership’.9 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the foreign policy decision-making and implementation of 
the Asia Pivot. In order to do so, it will address the following, interrelated research questions: 
1. Is the Pivot an example of foreign policy success, or failure? 
2. What have been the costs and benefits of the Pivot for the US and regional actors? 
By using an analytical framework designed to compare policy options, this analysis will highlight 
the successes and failures of the Pivot strategy. In doing so, it will seek to demonstrate the wider 
implications of foreign policy implementation for state credibility, which if damaged can adversely 
affect regional and international peace and security. 
 
The definition and dimensions of foreign policy ‘success’ 
In order to test the success of the Asia pivot as a foreign policy strategy, David Baldwin’s 
analytical framework as detailed in his 2000 Annual Review of Political Science article “Success 
and Failure in Foreign Policy” has been adopted.10 Baldwin uses a common set of concepts to 
help facilitate ‘policy-relevant foreign policy evaluation’, and clearly specify the conditions for 
success or failure.
11
  
As Baldwin notes, estimating success or failure becomes challenging because the very concept 
of success is so ‘slippery’.12 However, his loose definition is a useful starting point for our 
analysis, where success is defined in terms of favourable or desired policy outcomes, without 
excessive costs. Any assessment of success therefore relies upon a consideration of both costs 
and benefits.
13
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‘Success’ is understood as a multi-dimensional concept, that takes into account the following 
dimensions of success to which foreign policy judgments may be made:
14
 
 Effectiveness/degree of goal attainment, whereby policy makers pursue multiple goals 
with respect to multiple targets. Despite this ‘success is often measured solely in terms of 
primary goals and targets’.15 
 Costs to the user. Of relevance here is the extent to which maximising goal satisfaction 
was efficient, and exceeded any costs incurred.
16
 
 Costs to the target, where ‘the higher the costs for noncompliance that an instrument of 
statecraft inflicts on the target, the more successful it is’.17 
 Identification of who has most at stake in the issue, the user? Or the target? As Baldwin 
highlights, ‘the bigger the stakes, the more valuable is the degree of achievement and the 
more successful is the influence attempt’.18 
Importantly, failure to ask all of these questions can lead to serious policy mistakes.
19
 The 
ensuing analysis will use Baldwin’s analytical framework to evaluate the success or failure of the 
Asia Pivot strategies’ five core underlying principles. It will then consider some of the wider 
implications of the policy for state credibility and regional security. 
 
Analysis of the Pivot as a strategy of foreign policy 
Before evaluating the pivot strategy, it is important to note that this analysis is based on the 
Obama administration’s stated foreign policy goals in Asia. Any unstated goals, such as 
countering the rise of China and/or maintaining the regional balance of power, have been omitted 
from the analysis due to a lack of supporting empirical data.   
United States’ commitment to security in the region 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Obama administration’s pivot strategy, and the most 
controversial, was the renewed commitment to enhancing security in the region. It began with a 
2011 announcement to expand US military presence in the region, with a deployment of 2,500 
Marines to a de facto base in Darwin, Australia.
20
 The United States Navy also announced an 
intention to station several new coastal combat ships at Singapore’s naval facility.21 In 2015, it 
was announced that the United States and Singapore had agreed on the first deployment of the 
US P8 Poseidon spy plane.
22
 The Obama administration also sought out new areas of military 
cooperation with the Philippines, including an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 
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(EDCA) signed in 2014, which allows US troops and equipment wide access to Philippines’ 
military bases.
23
  
In a January 2012 ‘strategy review’, the Obama administration endorsed the continued 
deployment of 11 aircraft carriers (although deployments and maintenance issues have often 
reduced this number).
24
 The strategy also supported continued production of attack 
submarines.
25
 In an effort to maintain a visible presence in the region, particularly around the 
waters of the South China Sea, the United States has engaged in a number of Freedom of 
Navigation patrols, including sailing warships within 12 nautical miles of features claimed by 
China. The United States’ Department of Defense also sought to enhance and diversify US 
power projection capabilities through the development of a strategic initiative called the Air-Sea 
Battle (ASB) concept. The purpose of the ASB was ‘to increase the joint operating effectiveness 
of US naval and Air Force units, particularly in operations for countering anti-access strategies’.26 
With a focus on equipping the US armed forces to effectively deter threats posed by advanced 
weapon systems, the doctrine appeared to represent a plan for countering China’s enhanced 
military capabilities.
27
  
The costs of these initiatives for the United States should not be underestimated. If China was to 
perceive an enhanced US presence in Asia as a threat, it could risk sparking an arms race and 
regional security dilemma. As it stands, China has responded to these initiatives by accelerating 
its military modernization, in addition to the pace of island-building in the South China Sea.
28
 
China’s actions to counter the US presence seem to have come at little cost, with the United 
States failing to provide a robust response to Chinese expansionism. Whilst in many ways this 
has helped prevent an escalation of conflict in Asia, it has left regional allies unsure of the 
reliability of the United States’ commitment to regional security. 
Building a cooperative relationship with China 
From the outset, the Obama administration emphasised the importance of developing a 
diplomatic partnership with China. In 2009, President Obama stated that the US does ‘not seek 
to contain China’s rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and prosperous and 
successful member of the community of nations’.29 He emphasised the need to forge closer ties 
to address a host of international challenges, of mutual interest to the United States and China. 
These included lifting the global economy out of a recession, combatting climate change and 
seeking to counter nuclear proliferation. 
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On these fronts, the Obama administration had mixed results. Positive steps were made towards 
a joint response to the threat posed by climate change. President Obama and President Xi 
Jinping met at the Sunnylands retreat in 2013, where they signed an agreement to cooperate on 
eliminating hydroflurocarbons (HFCs).
30
 In November 2014, the US and China released a Joint 
Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation.
31
 This was followed in 
September 2015 and March 2016 by Joint Presidential Statements on Climate Change,
32
 and the 
announcement that both the US and China would ratify the Paris Climate Change Agreement in 
September 2016. The United States and China also displayed a degree of cooperation whilst 
negotiating the Iran nuclear deal. Both President Obama and President Jinping praised each 
other for their role in the negotiations, with the Chinese President highlighting the close 
communication and coordination between the two.
33
 
However, not all cooperation attempts between the United States and China have been 
successful. Despite a number of agreements to cooperate in restraining North Korea from 
developing nuclear and ballistic missiles, the feeling from within Washington was that China was 
not doing enough to leverage North Korea.
34
 Economic cooperation also reflected a degree of 
competition, with China left out of the TPP, and the United States refusing to join the Chinese-led 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China has also been forced to respond to the United 
States’ pivot strategy, which has undoubtedly strained cooperation between the two. As Ross 
notes, “the new US policy unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s insecurities” in the region.35 China 
has responded with its own regional initiatives, including expansion and military build-up in 
disputed waters in the South China Sea, a renewed diplomatic charm offensive in East and 
Southeast Asia, and $900 billion of planned investments linked with its ‘One Belt One Road’ 
project.
36
 In many respects, these initiatives are in direct competition with the Obama 
administration’s pivot strategy, and have failed to enhance cooperation between the two states. 
This has negatively impacted on the degree of US goal attainment, whilst inflicting costs on both 
parties.  
Advance US-Asia shared prosperity 
The advancement of US-Asia shared prosperity has had a similar mixed success, and has been 
one of the more controversial policies of the Obama administration’s pivot. A number of bilateral 
deals were struck between the United States and Asian countries. These included a free trade 
deal with South Korea in 2011, commercial deals with Vietnam worth $16 billion, a $21.7 billion 
jet deal between Boeing and Indonesia’s largest private carrier, Lion Air, several commercial 
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deals between Malaysian and American companies worth $2 billion, and deals worth around $10 
billion with India, including an engine contract for General Electric. 
Despite these deals, it is clear that the cornerstone of President Obama’s economic policy in 
Asia was the TPP. The regional trade agreement, signed by a number of Asian member states, 
including Brunei, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Japan, was 
designed to lower tariffs to promote economic growth, enhance innovation and productivity, 
reduce poverty and promote transparency.
37
 Despite China’s willingness to consider joining the 
TPP, it seems clear that the purpose of the TPP was to counter China’s increasing economic 
power in the region. As president Obama confirmed, “When more than 95 percent of our 
potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of 
the global economy”.38 This only served to enhance China’s fears that the United States was 
seeking to contain it. Additionally, the TPP received little domestic support, even within the 
Democrat party. It was unclear whether president Obama would have succeeded in convincing 
Congress to pass the deal, and it subsequently became a target in the 2016 election campaign, 
with both Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump opposing the agreement. 
Ultimately, with the election of Donald Trump, the TPP has fallen by the wayside. Abandoning 
the trade deal has left signatories let down by the United States’ lack of commitment and 
reliability, and concerned for the future of the agreement. Whether China’s own regional projects, 
such as the AIIB or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, will benefit from the 
fallout remains to be seen. The United States’ inability to follow through on the TPP could cost 
the US significantly, with China as the main beneficiary.   
Reengage with regional organisations 
One of the more successful policies of the pivot strategy was the Obama administration’s 
determination to reengage with regional organisations. In July 2009, US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC), Southeast Asia’s regional peace treaty. At a news conference before signing 
the agreement, Clinton declared that ‘the United States is back in Southeast Asia’.39 Following 
this, in November 2011, president Obama became the first American president to attend the East 
Asia Summit (EAS).
40
   
The Obama administration sought to enhance ASEAN engagement in recognition of the 
organisation’s increasing importance as a powerful economic actor. The 10 countries of ASEAN 
represent the United States’ fourth-largest trading partner, with $216 billion in two-way goods 
trade in 2014.
41
 The ASEAN-US relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in 
                                                          
37
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” 
October 2015. Found at: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership 
38
 Sara Hsu, “China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Diplomat, October 14, 2015. Found at: 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-and-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ 
39
 Dean Yates and Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. signs ASEAN treaty, boosts engagement,” Reuters, July 22, 2009. 
Found at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-usa-idUSTRE56L11920090722 
40
 Matt Compton, “President Obama at the East Asia Summit,” The White House, November 18, 2011. Found 
at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/11/18/president-obama-east-asia-summit 
41
 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: US-ASEAN Economic Engagement,” November 
21, 2015. Found at: https://asean.usmission.gov/fact-sheet-u-s-asean-economic-engagement/ 
7 
 
November 2015.
42
  Three months later, in February 2016, President Obama met with the ten 
members of ASEAN for a two-day summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage. This was 
the first US-ASEAN summit to be hosted by the United States.
43
 On the agenda were 
discussions related to the strengthening of trade and economic partnerships, as well as 
enhanced security cooperation, particularly with respect to the South China Sea.  
Overall, President Obama had a good degree of success at enhancing regional engagement. 
This has generally benefitted both the United States and regional states, which have gained 
economic and security benefits from an enhanced US role. However, it must be noted that by 
escalating engagement in Asia, the Obama administration has risked increasing tensions with 
China, which has observed the US charm offensive with a degree of mistrust and trepidation. As 
such, the long term costs of miscalculation could outweigh the short term benefits of enhanced 
engagement. 
Support for fundamental human rights 
It can be argued that support for human rights, whilst an important component of the Asia Pivot, 
did not constitute a primary foreign policy goal. As such, United States’ support for human rights 
in Asia following the pivot can be best described as a ‘mixed bag’.44 The Obama administration 
imposed sanctions on the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and a further fourteen of the 
reclusive state’s top officials for human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, forced 
labour and torture.
45
 This was part of Barack Obama’s wider strategy to isolate and punish North 
Korea for its continued efforts to develop nuclear and ballistic missiles.  
Obama was initially criticised for his warm embrace in January 2015 of India’s Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, once denied a visa to the United States on the grounds that he had participated 
in the subversion of religious-freedom.
46
 However, this was somewhat redeemed when President 
Obama drew attention to human rights during his visit, calling for religious tolerance and an end 
to gender discrimination.
47
 In haste to engage with Myanmar following democratic elections in 
2015, the United States pledged to lift all sanctions imposed on the country. A number of human 
rights groups labelled this move as premature, given the slow pace of reform in the country.
48
 
Similarly, in Vietnam, President Obama announced an end to the United States’ arms embargo 
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in 2016. He did so, despite tangible evidence of any improvement in the country’s human rights 
record, once so integral to US enhanced engagement with Vietnam.
49
 
Ultimately, the Obama administration appears, in some instances at least, to have relaxed its 
focus on human rights in favour of enhanced relations with states that are considered of geo-
strategic importance. This would not be the first time the United States has favoured geopolitics 
over human rights, and the benefits of this approach arguably exceed any potential costs 
incurred to the United States’ reputation.  
Analysis of the Pivot: A Summary  
Having examined the various United States’ policies that constitute the pivot strategy, it is clear 
there was a mixed degree of goal attainment, with excessive costs to the United States and its 
regional allies, and limited costs to China, which often appeared as the target of US state 
policies. Considering what was at stake if the US Asia pivot policy was to fail – namely United 
States relevance as a Pacific actor - this lack of success is surprising. At the core of the Obama 
administration’s pivot strategy was a desire to reinforce the United States position in the Asia 
Pacific, by bolstering regional alliances, and enhancing regional security and joint economic 
prosperity. However, policies implemented to achieve these goals have in some cases had the 
opposite effect. The United States’ efforts to commit more troops and resources in the Asia 
Pacific have been countered by Chinese expansion in the region, which has only succeeded in 
escalating regional tensions. The costs of this escalation for all parties are significant. Alliances 
forged by Barack Obama during this time have also floundered, with the Philippines in particular 
having turned toward China following the election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. 
Economically, the Obama administration’s flagship regional trade agreement has failed, and the 
smaller bilateral arrangements agreed during this period fail to compensate for this. Regional 
allies which signed onto the agreement have borne the brunt of the TPP’s failure, as has the 
United States’ image as a reliable regional actor and alliance partner. This has cost both the 
United States and regional states, whilst benefitting China, which will undoubtedly take 
advantage of the TPP’s failure to push its own economic initiatives in the region. Ironically, this 
outcome is the opposite of what president Obama was striving for. Despite president Obama 
highlighting areas of mutual cooperation between the US and China, the pivot strategy has 
strained these great power relations. Unsure of US intentions, China has had little option but to 
assert its role in the region, and has done so at the pivot’s expense. Regional actors, hopeful that 
the Asia pivot would restore a balance of power to the region, have been left unsure as to the 
United States continued commitment, and how this will impact their own relations with China.  
 
Wider Implications of the Asia Pivot 
Using Baldwin’s framework to analyse the various components that constituted the Asia pivot, we 
can determine that despite some successes, the policy as a whole was not a successful strategy. 
Since 2009, tensions in the Asia Pacific have escalated, which has been of little benefit to the 
United States, its regional allies, or China. The long term costs of the pivot have yet to be seen, 
but raise some interesting questions about the implications for the making of foreign policy.  
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In many respects, the Asia pivot was based in sound decision making,
50
 with objectives and 
policies that were feasible and that would not incur excessive costs. Indeed, a number of the 
policies that constituted the pivot reflected a degree of foreign policy continuity from previous 
administrations, most notably the Bush administration. The TPP, which became the cornerstone 
of President Obama’s economic policy in Asia, had its origins in the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership, which the Bush Administration joined in late 2008.
51
 The pivot also 
continued with a number of Bush-era policy commitments in Asia, including rotational military 
deployments in the region and strengthened partnerships with India and Vietnam.
52
  
Analysing the Obama administration’s framing of the pivot suggests two factors, which may have 
contributed to the lack of foreign policy success. First, whilst the decision to shift focus towards 
Asia was arguably a sound one, the Obama administration displayed a degree of naiveté with 
respect to China’s response. Any attempts to enhance US-China cooperation, whilst 
simultaneously strengthening United States’ military presence in the Asia Pacific, was going to 
be met with some degree of resistance by China. It is conceivable that policy makers viewed this 
as a calculated risk, with any arising misperceptions or tensions to be resolved through 
diplomacy. Instead, China responded tit for tat, which escalated tensions in the Asia Pacific. 
Crucially, the United States lacked an effective response to this escalation. 
This was compounded by errors in the implementation of the pivot as a foreign policy strategy. 
The Obama administration unveiled the pivot strategy in a high profile manner, through a series 
of presidential visits, announcements, speeches and articles.
53
 It was clear from the outset that 
the pivot was to be the Obama administration’s defining foreign policy for the Asia Pacific region. 
In doing so, the United States committed itself to an approach which would require a lot of time, 
attention and resources, all of which, it soon became apparent, were in short supply. The United 
States was not able to turn its back on the Middle East, and the Obama administration was not 
prepared for China’s pace of militarisation in the South China Sea. The end result was a pivot 
which did not fully live up to its own hype. Had the Obama administration merely promised to 
enhance engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, without the narrative of the pivot, expectations 
would not have been raised, only to be repeatedly let down.   
To quote Richard Haas, “in foreign policy 80 percent of life is following up”, and in the case of the 
pivot, “inconsistent US policy was to leave the Asia-Pacific in a sort of limbo, stable on the 
surface but unsure of its future”.54 The wider implications of this are that the United States has 
lost its reputation as a reliable and credible regional actor. In the long run, this credibility is 
something which the United States might struggle to regain.  
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